Does Warming Do More Good or Harm?

Tol, Richard S. J.  “A meta-analysis of the total economic impact of climate change.”  Energy Policy 185:113922.  2024.  Tol's latest meta-analysis of published estimates of the total economic effect of warming, with a separate review of studies that relate economic growth to weather.  It overturns his own earlier finding of an initial benefit.

1. 1a.

   Page 11:  “(1) The initially positive impacts have vanished: The central estimate of the economic impact of global warming is always negative. The effects of carbon dioxide fertilization and reduced winter cold on heating costs and human health are still positive, but newer studies reckon these are relatively smaller than earlier studies. (2) The confidence interval about the estimates has widened considerably, and now includes no impact for very considerable warming.” ↩ ↩ ↩

2. 1b.

   Page 5:  “Researchers disagree on the sign of the net impact, but agree on the order of magnitude: The welfare loss (or gain) caused by climate change is equivalent to the welfare loss caused by an income drop of at most ten percent—a century of climate change is not worse than losing a decade of economic growth.” ↩

Cornwall Alliance for the Stewardship of Creation.  A Renewed Call to Truth, Prudence, and Protection of the Poor:  An Evangelical Examination of the Theology, Science, and Economics of Global Warming.  2009.  The longer companion to the Cornwall Alliance's Evangelical Declaration on Global Warming, with chapters on theology, science and economics.  Its summaries argue that warming is mostly natural and that cutting fossil fuels would hurt the poor.

1. 2a.

   Section Executive Summary:  “Our examination of the economics  of global warming alarmism (Chapter Three) finds that it exaggerates the harms from global warming and ignores or underestimates the benefits not only from warming but also from increased atmospheric carbon dioxide.” ↩

2. 2b.

   Section Executive Summary:  “condemn the world’s poor to generations of continued misery characterized by rampant disease and premature death.” ↩

3. 2c.

   Section Executive Summary of Chapter Three:  “Although some sector-level economic studies in agriculture and forestry indicate that warming might enhance well-being, most models find that human well-being improves because of economic growth with or without warming but improves less with significant warming.” ↩ ↩

4. 2d.

   Section Executive Summary of Chapter One:  “For example, such fuels are currently the most abundant and affordable alternatives to dirty fuels, like wood and dung, which are now used by two billion people and cause millions of deaths and hundreds of millions of illnesses from respiratory diseases contracted by breathing their smoke. Insisting on the use of more expensive alternative fuels because of global warming fears means depriving the poor of the abundant, affordable energy they need to rise from abject poverty and its attendant miseries.” ↩ ↩ ↩

5. 2e.

   Section Executive Summary:  “given a mandate to act as stewards over the Earth—filling, subduing, and ruling it for God’s glory and mankind’s benefit.” ↩

Zhu, Zaichun et al.  “Greening of the Earth and its drivers.”  Nature Climate Change 6:791–795.  2016.  Three satellite records of leaf area for 1982–2009 combined with ten ecosystem models run with and without rising CO2, nitrogen deposition, climate change and land-use change, to apportion the observed greening among them.  The shares are model attributions with wide uncertainty.

1. 3a.

   Page 791:  “We show a persistent and widespread increase of growing season integrated LAI (greening) over 25% to 50% of the global vegetated area, whereas less than 4% of the globe shows decreasing LAI (browning).”  “suggest that CO2 fertilization effects explain 70% of the observed greening trend, followed by nitrogen deposition (9%), climate change (8%) and land cover change (LCC) (4%).”  LAI is leaf area index, the leaf area above each unit of ground.  In the paper's own table the CO2 share is 70.1 ± 29.4 %. ↩ ↩

Zhao, Qi et al.  “Global, regional, and national burden of mortality associated with non-optimal ambient temperatures from 2000 to 2019:  a three-stage modelling study.”  The Lancet Planetary Health 5(7):e415–e425.  2021.  A global model built from daily deaths and temperatures in 750 places in 43 countries, extended to every populated grid cell on earth for 2000–2019.  It is the first global estimate of cold and heat deaths and of how they changed as the world warmed, holding population and income fixed.

1. 4a.

   Page e420:  “Globally, 5 083 173 deaths (95% eCI 4 087 967–5 965 520) were associated with non-optimal temperatures per year, consisting of 4 594 098 cold-related deaths (3 337 222–5 640 617) and 489 075 heat-related deaths (304 216–732 518; table 1).” ↩ ↩

2. 4b.

   Page e415:  “From 2000–03 to 2016–19, the global cold-related excess death ratio changed by –0·51 percentage points (95% eCI –0·61 to –0·42) and the global heat-related excess death ratio increased by 0·21 percentage points (0·13–0·31), leading to a net reduction in the overall ratio.”  Page e423:  “The global daily mean temperature increased by 0·26°C per decade during this time”. ↩ ↩ ↩

Zhao's 5,083,173 temperature deaths are 9.43 % of all deaths in the modelled cells ⁴, which implies about 53.9 million deaths a year.  A change of −0.51 percentage points in the cold share is about 275,000 fewer cold deaths;  +0.21 points in the heat share is about 113,000 more heat deaths;  the net −0.30 points (95 % range −0.13 to −0.44) is about 162,000 fewer (70,000 to 237,000) ⁴.  The figures compare the rates of 2000–03 and 2016–19 with population, mortality and income held at 2010 levels. ↩ ↩

Climate Feedback (Science Feedback).  Global warming contributes to increased heat-related mortality, contrary to Bjorn Lomborg’s unsupported claims that climate change is saving hundreds of thousands of lives each year.  Sep 4, 2021.  A fact-check of Lomborg's claim by a site that recruits scientists to review climate statements, with comments written for it by Antonio Gasparrini, Yuming Guo and Kristie Ebi.  The comments are statements to the reviewers, not published papers.

1. 6a.

   Section Yuming Guo:  “Cold-related mortality decreased and heat-related mortality increased from 2000 to 2019, causing a net decrease in total deaths. However, it is not correct to interpret that this net decrease was caused by climate change. We just estimated the trend of mortality burden related to non-optimal temperatures, but did not do further analysis to examine whether this change is due to climate change or other factors.”  Guo, of Monash University, wrote on behalf of the research network that produced the study. ↩

IPCC.  “Summary for Policymakers.”  Climate Change 2021:  The Physical Science Basis.  Contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 3–32.  Cambridge University Press.  2021.  The summary of the IPCC's 2021 assessment of the physical science, line by line approved by member governments.  It is the mainstream statement of what has been observed and what is projected.

1. 7a.

   Section A.1.7, page 5:  “Global mean sea level increased by 0.20 [0.15 to 0.25] m between 1901 and 2018. The average rate of sea level rise was 1.3 [0.6 to 2.1] mm yr–1 between 1901 and 1971, increasing to 1.9 [0.8 to 2.9] mm yr–1 between 1971 and 2006, and further increasing to 3.7 [3.2 to 4.2] mm yr–1 between 2006 and 2018 (high confidence).” ↩ ↩

2. 7b.

   Section B.5.3, page 21:  “Relative to 1995–2014, the likely global mean sea level rise by 2100 is 0.28–0.55 m under the very low GHG emissions scenario (SSP1-1.9); 0.32–0.62 m under the low GHG emissions scenario (SSP1-2.6); 0.44–0.76 m under the intermediate GHG emissions scenario (SSP2-4.5); and 0.63–1.01 m under the very high GHG emissions scenario (SSP5-8.5)”.  “Global mean sea level rise above the likely range – approaching 2 m by 2100 and 5 m by 2150 under a very high GHG emissions scenario (SSP5-8.5) (low confidence) – cannot be ruled out due to deep uncertainty in ice-sheet processes.” ↩

3. 7c.

   Section A.3.1, page 8:  “It is virtually certain that hot extremes (including heatwaves) have become more frequent and more intense across most land regions since the 1950s, while cold extremes (including cold waves) have become less frequent and less severe, with high confidence that human-induced climate change is the main driver”.  A footnote number follows "driver" in the original and is omitted here. ↩ ↩ ↩

4. 7d.

   Section A.3.2, page 8:  “The frequency and intensity of heavy precipitation events have increased since the 1950s over most land area for which observational data are sufficient for trend analysis (high confidence), and human-induced climate change is likely the main driver.”  “Human-induced climate change has contributed to increases in agricultural and ecological droughts”.  “in some regions due to increased land evapotranspiration”.  “(medium confidence)”. ↩

5. 7e.

   Section A.3.4, page 9:  “It is likely that the global proportion of major (Category 3–5) tropical cyclone occurrence has increased over the last four decades”.  “There is low confidence in long-term (multi-decadal to centennial) trends in the frequency of all-category tropical cyclones.” ↩

IPCC.  “Summary for Policymakers.”  Climate Change 2022:  Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability.  Contribution of Working Group II to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 3–33.  Cambridge University Press.  2022.  The government-approved summary of the IPCC's 2022 assessment of climate impacts.  It is the mainstream statement of the harm case, and it also records the benefits the assessment found.

1. 8a.

   Section B.1, page 9:  “Human-induced climate change, including more frequent and intense extreme events, has caused widespread adverse impacts and related losses and damages to nature and people, beyond natural climate variability.” ↩

2. 8b.

   Section B.1.3, page 9:  “Although overall agricultural productivity has increased, climate change has slowed this growth over the past 50 years globally (medium confidence), related negative impacts were mainly in mid- and low latitude regions but positive impacts occurred in some high latitude regions (high confidence).” ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩

3. 8c.

   Section B.1.6, page 11:  “Some positive economic effects have been identified in regions that have benefited from lower energy demand as well as comparative advantages in agricultural markets and tourism (high confidence).” ↩ ↩

4. 8d.

   Section B.4.4, page 15:  “dengue risk will increase with longer seasons and a wider geographic distribution in Asia, Europe, Central and South America and sub-Saharan Africa, potentially putting additional billions of people at risk by the end of the century (high confidence).” ↩ ↩

5. 8e.

   Section Footnote 35, page 15:  “There is evidence that some regions could benefit from low levels of warming (high confidence).” ↩

6. 8f.

   Section B.4.6, page 15:  “Projected estimates of global aggregate net economic damages generally increase non-linearly with global warming levels (high confidence).”  “The wide range of global estimates, and the lack of comparability between methodologies, does not allow for identification of a robust range of estimates (high confidence).” ↩

7. 8g.

   Section B.4.1, page 14:  “In terrestrial ecosystems, 3 to 14% of species assessed”.  “will likely face very high risk of extinction”.  “at global warming levels of 1.5°C, increasing up to 3 to 18% at 2°C, 3 to 29% at 3°C, 3 to 39% at 4°C, and 3 to 48% at 5°C.”  Footnote markers 33 and 34 in the original are omitted. ↩

8. 8h.

   Section B.4.2, page 14:  “Risks in physical water availability and water-related hazards will continue to increase by the mid- to long-term in all assessed regions, with greater risk at higher global warming levels (high confidence). At approximately 2°C global warming, snowmelt water availability for irrigation is projected to decline in some snowmelt dependent river basins by up to 20%”. ↩

Long, Stephen P. et al.  “Food for Thought:  Lower-Than-Expected Crop Yield Stimulation with Rising CO2 Concentrations.”  Science 312(5782):1918–1921.  2006.  A comparison of crop yield responses to CO2 in open-field FACE trials with those from the enclosure studies on which crop models had been built.

1. 9a.

   Page 1918:  “In those trials, elevated [CO2] enhanced yield by ∼50% less than in enclosure studies. This casts serious doubt on projections that rising [CO2] will fully offset losses due to climate change.” ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩

Myers, Samuel S. et al.  “Increasing CO2 threatens human nutrition.”  Nature 510:139–142.  2014.  Nutrient measurements on grains and legumes grown in open-field CO2 enrichment trials at seven sites in Japan, Australia and the United States at 546–586 ppm, compared with the same crops at today's CO2.  Mirror:  PMC

1. 10a.

   Section Results:  “wheat grains grown at elevated [CO2] have 9.3% (95% CI: −12.7, −5.9) lower zinc and 5.1% (95% CI: −6.5, −3.7) lower iron than those grown at ambient [CO2].”  “We also find that elevated [CO2] is associated with lower protein in C3 grasses with a 6.3% (95% CI: −7.5, −5.2) decrease in wheat grains and a 7.8% (95% CI: −8.9, −6.8) decrease in rice grains.”  Wording from the authors' accepted manuscript. ↩ ↩ ↩

Vicedo-Cabrera, Ana M. et al.  “The burden of heat-related mortality attributable to recent human-induced climate change.”  Nature Climate Change 11:492–500.  2021.  A study of warm-season deaths in 732 places in 43 countries, 1991–2018, comparing heat deaths under the actual climate with those under a modelled climate without human influence.  It measures the heat cost of warming so far and does not count cold deaths.

1. 11a.

   Section Results:  “The overall estimate is 37.0% but this percentage varied widely across subregions and countries. The largest climate change-induced contributions (>50%) were in southern and western Asia (Iran and Kuwait), southeast Asia (Philippines and Thailand) and several countries in Central and South America”. ↩

Lobell, David B. et al.  “Climate Trends and Global Crop Production Since 1980.”  Science 333(6042):616–620.  2011.  Statistical models linking national yields of maize, wheat, rice and soybeans to temperature and rainfall, used to compare actual 1980–2008 production with production had the climate not trended.

1. 12a.

   Page 616:  “Models that link yields of the four largest commodity crops to weather indicate that global maize and wheat production declined by 3.8 and 5.5%, respectively, relative to a counterfactual without climate trends. For soybeans and rice, winners and losers largely balanced out. Climate trends were large enough in some countries to offset a significant portion of the increases in average yields that arose from technology, carbon dioxide fertilization, and other factors.” ↩ ↩

Ortiz-Bobea, Ariel et al.  “Anthropogenic climate change has slowed global agricultural productivity growth.”  Nature Climate Change 11(4):306–312.  2021.  An econometric model of how weather affects farm productivity in each country, 1961 onward, run with and without the human-caused part of the climate trend.  It measures total factor productivity, output per unit of all farm inputs, not yield.  Mirror:  arXiv

1. 13a.

   Section Abstract:  “Our baseline model indicates that ACC has reduced global agricultural TFP by about 21% since 1961, a slowdown that is equivalent to losing the last 7 years of productivity growth. The effect is substantially more severe (a reduction of ~26–34%) in warmer regions such as Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean.”  Section Discussion:  “our estimates do not remove the direct effect that rising CO2 concentrations has on agricultural production”.  ACC is anthropogenic climate change;  TFP is total factor productivity.  The second quotation is from the authors' preprint. ↩ ↩

IPCC.  “Summary for Policymakers.”  Global Warming of 1.5°C.  An IPCC Special Report.  2018.  The summary of the IPCC's 2018 special report comparing the impacts of 1.5 °C and 2 °C of warming.

1. 14a.

   Section B.4.2, page 8:  “Coral reefs, for example, are projected to decline by a further 70–90% at 1.5°C (high confidence) with larger losses (>99%) at 2°C (very high confidence).” ↩ ↩

Goklany, Indur M.  “Deaths and Death Rates from Extreme Weather Events:  1900–2008.”  Journal of American Physicians and Surgeons 14(4):102–109.  2009.  A compilation of global deaths from droughts, floods, storms, heat and other weather extremes by decade since 1900, mostly from the EM-DAT disaster database, with death rates per million people.  Goklany worked on climate and environmental policy for the U.S. government and argues that wealth and fossil fuels explain the fall.  The journal is a small advocacy-leaning outlet, so the figures are worth checking against the peer-reviewed literature, as this article does.

1. 15a.

   Page 102:  “In fact, even though reporting of such events is more complete than in the past, morbidity and mortality attributed to them has declined globally by 93%–98% since the 1920s.”  “These improvements reflect a remarkable improvement in society’s adaptive capacity, likely due to greater wealth and better technology enabled in part by use of hydrocarbon fuels.” ↩ ↩

2. 15b.

   Page 104:  “Specifically, comparing the 1920s to the latest (2000–2008) period, the annual number of deaths declined from 484,900 to 35,200, a 93% decline, while the death rate per million dropped from 241.5 to 5.4, a decline of 98%.” ↩ ↩ ↩

Formetta, Giuseppe, and Luc Feyen.  “Empirical evidence of declining global vulnerability to climate-related hazards.”  Global Environmental Change 57:101920.  2019.  A study of 16,412 floods, storms, heatwaves, cold waves, droughts and other climate-related disasters in Munich Re's records for 1980–2016, dividing deaths and losses by the population and wealth exposed to each hazard to measure vulnerability rather than raw totals.  Mirror:  PMC

1. 16a.

   Section Abstract:  “Results show a clear decreasing trend in both human and economic vulnerability, with global average mortality and economic loss rates that have dropped by 6.5 and nearly 5 times, respectively, from 1980–1989 to 2007–2016.”  Section Results:  “multi-hazard mortality rate is still 4.4 times larger in low/middle low income countries”. ↩ ↩

Nordhaus, William D.  “Revisiting the social cost of carbon.”  Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 114(7):1518–1523.  2017.  The 2016 revision of Nordhaus's DICE model, the most widely used model linking the economy, emissions, warming and damage.  It gives a social cost of carbon and shows how that cost changes with the discount rate and other assumptions.

1. 17a.

   Page 1519:  “Eq. 3 assumes that damages can be reasonably well approximated by a quadratic function of temperature change.”  “Including all factors, the final estimate is that the damages are 2.1% of global income at a 3 °C warming, and 8.5% of income at a 6 °C warming.” ↩ ↩

2. 17b.

   Page 1520, table 1:  “Alternative discount rates”.  “2.5% 128.5”.  “3% 79.1”.  “4% 36.3”.  “5% 19.7”.  Social cost of carbon for 2015, in 2010 international dollars per tonne of CO2, calculated along the current-policy path. ↩ ↩

3. 17c.

   Page 1520, table 1:  “The Stern Review discounting”.  “Uncalibrated† 197.4”.  Social cost of carbon for 2015, in 2010 international dollars per tonne of CO2, against the baseline of 31.2. ↩

Burke, Marshall et al.  “Global non-linear effect of temperature on economic production.”  Nature 527:235–239.  2015.  A study of 166 countries' annual output against their annual temperature, 1960–2010, finding that productivity peaks near a country-year average of 13 °C and falls at higher temperatures, then projected to 2100.  The 13 °C is a national annual mean, not a global one.

1. 18a.

   Page 235:  “with productivity peaking at an annual average temperature of 13◦ C and declining strongly at higher temperatures.”  “If future adaptation mimics past adaptation, unmitigated warming (RCP 8.5) will reshape the global economy by reducing average global incomes roughly 25% by 2100 and widening global income inequality, relative to scenarios without climate change.” ↩

2. 18b.

   Section Results:  “climate change reduces projected global output by 23% in 2100 (best estimate, SSP5) relative to a world without climate change, although statistical uncertainty allows for positive impacts with probability 0.29”. ↩ ↩

Bilal, Adrien, and Diego R. Känzig.  “The Macroeconomic Impact of Climate Change:  Global vs. Local Temperature.”  NBER Working Paper 32450.  National Bureau of Economic Research.  2024.  A working paper that estimates how world output responds to year-to-year swings in global, rather than national, temperature, and builds a model of the cost of warming from it.  Its damages are far larger than those of the sector-by-sector models.

1. 19a.

   Section Abstract:  “Exploiting natural global temperature variability, we find that 1°C warming reduces world GDP by over 20% in the long run.” ↩ ↩

Kotz, Maximilian et al.  “Retraction Note:  The economic commitment of climate change.”  Nature.  Dec 3, 2025.  The authors' notice withdrawing their 2024 paper, giving the reasons and the effect of the corrections.

1. 20a.

   Section Retraction Note:  “post-publication, the results were found to be sensitive to the removal of one country, Uzbekistan, where inaccuracies were noted in the underlying economic data for the period 1995–1999.”  “These changes led to discrepancies in the estimates for climate damages by mid-century, with an increased uncertainty range (from 11–29% to 6–31%)”.  “The authors acknowledge that these changes are too substantial for a correction, leading to the retraction of the paper.” ↩ ↩ ↩

Rennert, Kevin et al.  “Comprehensive evidence implies a higher social cost of CO2.”  Nature 610:687–692.  2022.  A social cost of carbon built from newer sector-by-sector damage studies, probabilistic emissions projections and a discount rate tied to market interest rates.  It underlies the U.S. EPA's 2023 estimate.

1. 21a.

   Page 687:  “Our preferred mean SC-CO2 estimate is $185 per tonne of CO2 ($44–$413 per tCO2: 5%–95% range, 2020 US dollars) at a near-term risk-free discount rate of 2%”.  Section Results:  “3% ($80 per tCO2 mean, $12–$197 per tCO2: 5%–95% range)”. ↩ ↩

Gasparrini, Antonio et al.  “Projections of temperature-related excess mortality under climate change scenarios.”  The Lancet Planetary Health 1(9):e360–e367.  2017.  Death-temperature curves from 451 places in 23 countries applied to five climate models under four emissions scenarios, region by region, to 2099, assuming no adaptation and no population change.  It is the standard test of whether fewer cold deaths offset more heat deaths.

1. 22a.

   Page e360:  “Results indicate, on average, a net increase in temperature-related excess mortality under high-emission scenarios, although with important geographical differences.”  Page e362:  “under the assumption of no adaptation or population changes”. ↩ ↩

Carleton, Tamma et al.  “Valuing the Global Mortality Consequences of Climate Change Accounting for Adaptation Costs and Benefits.”  NBER Working Paper 27599.  National Bureau of Economic Research.  2022.  Published in the Quarterly Journal of Economics 137(4):2037–2105 (2022);  page numbers here are those of the revised working paper.  Age-specific death-temperature curves from subnational data in 40 countries, allowed to flatten as places grow richer and as they adapt to their own climates, projected worldwide to 2100.  It counts both the deaths and the cost of the adaptation that prevents them.

1. 23a.

   Section Abstract:  “Notably, today’s cold locations are projected to benefit, while today’s poor and hot locations have large projected damages.” ↩ ↩

2. 23b.

   Page 22:  “The mean estimate of the mortality effects of climate change falls from 73 deaths per 100,000 under RCP8.5 to 11 deaths per 100,000 under the emissions stabilization scenario of RCP4.5. For RCP4.5, the median end-of-century estimate is 4, and the 10th to 90th percentile range is [-36, 62].” ↩ ↩

Ridley, Matt.  “Why climate change is good for the world.”  The Spectator.  Oct 19, 2013.  A magazine essay by a science writer and member of the House of Lords, the best-known statement of the claim that warming has done net good.  Its economic numbers come from Richard Tol's 2009 survey and Tol's 2011 model of the 20th and 21st centuries.

1. 24a.

   Paragraph 1:  “Climate change has done more good than harm so far and is likely to continue doing so for most of this century. This is not some barmy, right-wing fantasy; it is the consensus of expert opinion.” ↩

2. 24b.

   Paragraph 9:  “The chief benefits of global warming include: fewer winter deaths; lower energy costs; better agricultural yields; probably fewer droughts; maybe richer biodiversity.”  Paragraph 11:  “The greatest benefit from climate change comes not from temperature change but from carbon dioxide itself.” ↩

3. 24c.

   Paragraph 6:  “Or you can say the net benefit is small (which it is), you can argue that the benefits have accrued more to rich countries than poor countries (which is true) or you can emphasise that after 2080 climate change would probably do net harm to the world (which may also be true).” ↩ ↩ ↩

4. 24d.

   Paragraph 8:  “Note that if the world continues to grow at 3 per cent a year, then the average person will be about nine times as rich in 2080 as she is today. So low-lying Bangladesh will be able to afford the same kind of flood defences that the Dutch have today.” ↩

Hausfather, Zeke, and Glen P. Peters.  “Emissions – the 'business as usual' story is misleading.”  Nature 577:618–620.  2020.  A comment by two mainstream energy and climate researchers arguing that the IPCC's highest emissions scenario, RCP8.5, had been wrongly treated as the expected future, and that current policies point to about 3 °C of warming by 2100.  Many of the largest damage estimates in the literature assume RCP8.5.

1. 25a.

   Page 618:  “RCP8.5 was intended to explore an unlikely high-risk future”.  Page 619:  “Assessment of current policies suggests that the world is on course for around 3 °C of warming above pre-industrial levels by the end of the century”. ↩ ↩

Tol, Richard S. J.  “The Economic Impact of Climate Change in the 20th and 21st Centuries.”  Copenhagen Consensus on Human Challenges, Assessment Paper.  Copenhagen Consensus Center.  2011.  A run of Tol's FUND model, country by country, backward over the observed 20th-century climate and forward over a 21st-century scenario, summing farming, energy, health, water, storms, sea level and ecosystems as a share of income.  Published in revised form in Climatic Change 117 (2013).  It is the source of the "net benefit until 2080" claim, and it is a model result, not a measurement.

1. 26a.

   Page 2:  “Carbon dioxide fertilization of crops and reduced energy demand for heating are the main positive impacts. Climate change had a negative effect on water resources and, in most years, human health. Most countries benefitted from climate change until 1980, but after that the trend is negative for poor countries and positive for rich countries. The global average impact was positive in the 20th century. In the 21st century, impacts turn negative in most countries, rich and poor.” ↩ ↩ ↩

2. 26b.

   Page 7:  “After 1950, impacts became more positive, edging up to 1.4% of GDP by 2000. However, impacts roughly stabilize after that, reaching their maximum at 1.5% of GDP in 2025 and then precipitously fall to reach - 1.2% of GDP in 2100.”  The "-" before the line break in the original is a minus sign. ↩

Lomborg, Bjørn.  “Welfare in the 21st century:  Increasing development, reducing inequality, the impact of climate change, and the cost of climate policies.”  Technological Forecasting and Social Change 156:119981.  2020.  A review by the head of the Copenhagen Consensus Center that sets the IPCC's growth scenarios against Nordhaus-style damage estimates and the costs of climate policy.  Lomborg accepts that warming is real and mostly harmful, and argues that its cost is moderate and that most climate policies cost more than they save.

1. 27a.

   Section Abstract:  “Climate change is real and its impacts are mostly negative, but common portrayals of devastation are unfounded.”  “Global death risk from extreme weather has declined 99% over 100 years”.  “Climate-economic research shows that the total cost from untreated climate change is negative but moderate, likely equivalent to a 3.6% reduction in total GDP. Climate policies also have costs that often vastly outweigh their climate benefits.”  “Using carbon taxes, an optimal realistic climate policy can aggressively reduce emissions and reduce the global temperature increase from 4.1°C in 2100 to 3.75°C.”  “The popular 2°C target, in contrast, is unrealistic and would leave the world more than $250 trillion worse off.” ↩ ↩

Spencer, Roy W.  “Reasons Why Regulating CO2 Emissions Needs to be Reconsidered.”  Roy Spencer, PhD (blog).  Feb 26, 2025.  A blog essay by the co-founder of the UAH satellite temperature record, written as the U.S. EPA reconsidered its 2009 finding that greenhouse gases endanger health and welfare.  Spencer accepts that most of the warming may be human and argues that its benefits and the costs of regulation are ignored.

1. 28a.

   Section The Science:  “But whatever the level of warming, it might well be mostly human-caused.”  Section Costs vs. Benefits:  “But everything humans do requires energy, and so human flourishing depends upon abundant and affordable energy.”  Section The 2009 Endangerment Finding:  “It has been estimated global agricultural productivity has increased by trillions of dollars from crops growing better, with more drought resistance, in a CO2-enriched atmosphere.” ↩

Idso, Craig D.  The Positive Externalities of Carbon Dioxide:  Estimating the Monetary Benefits of Rising Atmospheric CO2 Concentrations on Global Food Production.  Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change.  Oct 21, 2013.  A report by the head of a CO2-advocacy research center.  It takes average growth responses of 45 crops from its own database of CO2-enrichment experiments, scales them to each year's CO2 above 280 ppm, and multiplies by world crop production and prices for 1961–2011.  It counts no harm from warming and is not peer reviewed.

1. 29a.

   Page 3:  “The results indicate that the annual total monetary value of this benefit grew from $18.5 billion in 1961 to over $140 billion by 2011, amounting to a total sum of $3.2 trillion over the 50-year period 1961-2011.” ↩ ↩

2. 29b.

   Page 8:  “the CO2 Science Plant Growth Database lists the results of thousands of CO2 enrichment experiments conducted on hundreds of different crops growing under varying environmental conditions over the past few decades”.  Page 10:  “the wheat-specific CO2 growth response factor of 34.9% per 300 ppm CO2 increase”. ↩ ↩

Batten, Don.  “Climate Change:  A biblical and scientific approach to Anthropogenic Global Warming.”  Creation Ministries International.  Feb 17, 2026 (edition of 2020).  CMI's main statement on modern climate, a long essay by its scientist Don Batten, a former research horticulturalist, written with colleagues.  It sets out a biblical history of climate, a case for low climate sensitivity, and a policy section on energy and the poor.

1. 30a.

   Section Concern for the environment:  “CO2 is ‘plant food’, and planet Earth’s plants would benefit from more of it, not less.”  Section Concern for the poor:  “Unscientific, illogical environmental extremism (e.g., Extinction Rebellion) will hurt the poor the most.” ↩

2. 30b.

   Section Introduction:  “As Christians, we affirm that we have a responsibility to look after the environment (stewardship of God’s creation). That is a given; see: Fouling the nest. We are also compelled to consider the poor and the general welfare of our neighbours.” ↩

3. 30c.

   Section 1. The real history of the world from the Bible:  “We have a biblical basis for our confidence that the climate is designed to be broadly stable. After the Flood, God promised: “While the earth remains, seedtime and harvest, cold and heat, summer and winter, day and night, shall not cease” (Genesis 8:22).” ↩

4. 30d.

   Section 1. The real history of the world from the Bible:  “The MWP was a very productive time both for crops and the advance of science, logic, architecture, and the arts. On the other hand, the ‘Little Ice Age’ (AD 1300–1870) was a significant period of cold. The shorter crop-growing seasons caused famines, plagues, and widespread poverty.” ↩

Romanello, Marina et al.  “The 2024 report of the Lancet Countdown on health and climate change:  facing record-breaking threats from delayed action.”  The Lancet 404(10465):1847–1896.  2024.  The yearly report of a collaboration of more than a hundred health and climate researchers, tracking health indicators of climate change.  Its heat-death figures are model estimates for people over 65, set against what ageing alone would have produced;  it does not net them against cold deaths.  Mirror:  PMC

1. 31a.

   Section Key messages:  “Heat-related mortality of people older than 65 years increased by a record-breaking 167%, compared with the 1990s, 102 percentage points higher than the 65% that would have been expected without temperature rise”.  Section Indicator 1.3.1:  “the climatic suitability for the transmission of dengue by Aedes albopictus and Aedes aegypti increased by 46·3% and 10·7%, respectively, between 1951–60 and 2014–23”.  Section Indicator 1.1.5:  “Although cold-related deaths currently exceed heat-related deaths, heat-related deaths are expected to exceed cold-related deaths in a high-warming scenario.” ↩ ↩

Kotz, Maximilian et al.  “The economic commitment of climate change.”  Nature 628:551–557.  2024.  A study of 40 years of income data from about 1,600 subnational regions that claimed a large, unavoidable income loss by mid-century.  Its authors retracted it in December 2025.

1. 32a.

   Page 551:  “we find that the world economy is committed to an income reduction of 19% within the next 26 years independent of future emission choices”. ↩

Evangelical Climate Initiative.  Climate Change:  An Evangelical Call to Action.  2006.  A statement signed by evangelical leaders accepting the mainstream view of human-caused climate change and calling for action, on grounds of love of neighbour and stewardship, with its science drawn from the IPCC and national academies.

1. 33a.

   Section Claim 2:  “Millions of people could die in this century because of climate change, most of them our poorest global neighbors.” ↩

2. 33b.

   Section Claim 3:  “Climate change is the latest evidence of our failure to exercise proper stewardship, and constitutes a critical opportunity for us to do better (Gen. 1:26-28).” ↩

3. 33c.

   Section Claim 3:  “Christians must care about climate change because we are called to love our neighbors, to do unto others as we would have them do unto us, and to protect and care for the least of these as though each was Jesus Christ himself (Mt. 22:34-40; Mt. 7:12; Mt. 25:31-46).”  Section Claim 2:  “Millions of people could die in this century because of climate change, most of them our poorest global neighbors.” ↩

Chen, Chi et al.  “China and India lead in greening of the world through land-use management.”  Nature Sustainability 2:122–129.  2019.  A NASA MODIS satellite analysis of leaf area for 2000–2017, country by country and by land type, showing how much of the greening comes from tree planting and intensive farming rather than from CO2 and climate.

1. 34a.

   Page 122:  “China alone accounts for 25% of the global net increase in leaf area with only 6.6% of global vegetated area.”  “Our results indicate that the direct factor is a key driver of the "Greening Earth", accounting for over a third, and likely more, of the observed net increase in green leaf area.”  The "direct factor" is human land-use management. ↩

Ainsworth, Elizabeth A., and Stephen P. Long.  “What have we learned from 15 years of free-air CO2 enrichment (FACE)?  A meta-analytic review of the responses of photosynthesis, canopy properties and plant production to rising CO2.”  New Phytologist 165:351–372.  2005.  A meta-analysis of open-field CO2 enrichment experiments, in which crops and trees grow outdoors with CO2 released over them, the most realistic test of the fertilisation effect.

1. 35a.

   Page 359:  “The average crop yield stimulation of 17% is lower than previous estimates of CO2 effects on crop yield, which ranged from 28 to 35%”.  Page 360:  “These FACE experiments elevated [CO2] by ≈ 200 ppm”. ↩ ↩

2. 35b.

   Page 359:  “There was no change in dry matter production for the five C4 species measured at the Maricopa FACE experiment and the BioCON FACE experiment, and neither C4 crops nor C4 wild grasses showed any dry matter production stimulation with growth at elevated [CO2] (Fig. 8).”  Page 360:  “Sorghum yield was not affected by growth at elevated [CO2].” ↩ ↩

Goklany, Indur M.  “Carbon Dioxide:  The Good News.”  GWPF Report 18.  Global Warming Policy Foundation.  2015.  A report for a think tank that opposes most climate policy, with a foreword by Freeman Dyson, setting out the benefits of higher CO2 for crops and ecosystems from published experiments and IPCC figures.  It is not peer reviewed.

1. 36a.

   Page 7:  “the AR5 estimate of a 20–25% yield increase for a doubling of carbon dioxide levels since preindustrial times translates into a 9–11% yield increase so far. Alternatively, a 34.6% increase in yield from a 300-ppm increase in carbon dioxide concentration, as calculated by the CSCDGC,† translates into a 15% yield increase due to anthropogenic emissions to date.”  The CSCDGC is Idso's Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change. ↩

Idso's totals are $3.2 trillion for 1961–2011 and over $140 billion in 2011 ²⁹, built on response factors from all kinds of enrichment experiments ²⁹.  FACE trials gave about half the yield gain of enclosure studies ^{9 35}.  Halving gives about $1.6 trillion and $70 billion a year.  This is a rough scale, not a re-estimate, and it subtracts nothing for warming's own effect on crops. ↩

Loladze, Irakli.  “Hidden shift of the ionome of plants exposed to elevated CO2 depletes minerals at the base of human nutrition.”  eLife 3:e02245.  2014.  A meta-analysis of 7,761 measurements of 25 minerals in 130 plant species and varieties grown at raised CO2, about 2,264 of them from open-field FACE trials.

1. 38a.

   Section Abstract:  “This study shows that eCO2 reduces the overall mineral concentrations (-8%, 95% confidence interval: -9.1 to -6.9, p<0.00001)”.  Section Results:  “It is plausible that the lower levels of CO2 in the FACE studies contributed to a smaller overall mineral decline (-6.1%, -7.8 to -4.4) cf. (-8.7%, -10.1 to -7.4) for the non-FACE studies.” ↩

Zhu, Chunwu et al.  “Carbon dioxide (CO2) levels this century will alter the protein, micronutrients, and vitamin content of rice grains with potential health consequences for the poorest rice-dependent countries.”  Science Advances 4(5):eaaq1012.  2018.  Open-field enrichment trials in Japan and China on 18 rice varieties at 568–590 ppm, measuring protein, minerals and vitamins in the grain.

1. 39a.

   Section Results:  “B9 (folate) were observed in response to projected CO2 levels with average declines among cultivars of −17.1, −16.6, −12.7, and −3”.  The four figures are for vitamins B1, B2, B5 and B9;  the text layer breaks before the folate figure, which is −30.3 %. ↩

Wang, Songhan et al.  “Recent global decline of CO2 fertilization effects on vegetation photosynthesis.”  Science 370(6522):1295–1300.  2020.  An analysis of satellite and ground measures of photosynthesis, 1982–2015, reporting that the response of plants to each added unit of CO2 has weakened, plausibly as nutrients and water become limiting.

1. 40a.

   Page 1295:  “we showed that global CFE has declined across most terrestrial regions of the globe from 1982 to 2015, correlating well with changing nutrient concentrations and availability of soil water.”  CFE is the CO2 fertilisation effect. ↩

Frankenberg, Christian et al.  “Comment on "Recent global decline of CO2 fertilization effects on vegetation photosynthesis".”  Science.  2021.  A technical comment re-examining the satellite record used by Wang and colleagues and finding that small sensor biases can produce the reported decline.

1. 41a.

   Section Abstract:  “We find that small systematic biases in Advanced Very High Resolution Radiometer (AVHRR) data affect their analysis to the degree that the key finding is not robust.” ↩

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.  Cereal yield, World (FAOSTAT), as distributed by Our World in Data.  2026.  Annual world cereal production per hectare harvested, 1961–2024, from FAO statistics.

1. 42a.

   Section World:  Tonnes per hectare:  1961, 1.3532;  2024, 4.2058. ↩

Zhao, Chuang et al.  “Temperature increase reduces global yields of major crops in four independent estimates.”  Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 114(35):9326–9331.  2017.  A synthesis of four methods (global crop models, site crop models, field-warming experiments and statistical studies) for the effect of warming alone on the four main crops, with CO2 held constant.

1. 43a.

   Page 9326:  “Without CO2 fertilization, effective adaptation, and genetic improvement, each degree-Celsius increase in global mean temperature would, on average, reduce global yields of wheat by 6.0%, rice by 3.2%, maize by 7.4%, and soybean by 3.1%.” ↩

Schlenker, Wolfram, and Michael J. Roberts.  “Nonlinear temperature effects indicate severe damages to U.S. crop yields under climate change.”  Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 106(37):15594–15598.  2009.  County yields of U.S. corn, soybeans and cotton, 1950–2005, matched to hour-by-hour temperature exposure, showing yields rise with warmth up to a threshold and then fall steeply.  The projections include no CO2 effect, as the authors note.

1. 44a.

   Page 15594:  “We find that yields increase with temperature up to 29° C for corn, 30° C for soybeans, and 32° C for cotton but that temperatures above these thresholds are very harmful.” ↩

Jägermeyr, Jonas et al.  “Climate impacts on global agriculture emerge earlier in new generation of climate and crop models.”  Nature Food 2:873–885.  2021.  The newest round of the global crop-model comparison, twelve crop models driven by five climate models, with CO2 rising along each scenario.

1. 45a.

   Section Abstract:  “Mean end-of-century maize productivity is shifted from +5% to −6% (SSP126) and from +1% to −24% (SSP585)—explained by warmer climate projections and improved crop model sensitivities. In contrast, wheat shows stronger gains (+9% shifted to +18%, SSP585), linked to higher CO2 concentrations and expanded high-latitude gains.”  The first figure in each pair is from the previous generation of models. ↩

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.  Climate Change Indicators in the United States:  Length of Growing Season.  Aug 2016.  The EPA's indicator of the frost-free season in the contiguous United States since 1895, from daily station minimum temperatures.

1. 46a.

   Page 1:  “The average length of the growing season in the contiguous 48 states has increased by nearly two weeks since the beginning of the 20th century.” ↩

King, Myron et al.  “Northward shift of the agricultural climate zone under 21st-century global climate change.”  Scientific Reports 8:7904.  2018.  Seven climate models used to map where the boreal zone becomes warm enough for small grains by 2099, with a check on water balance.  It models suitable climate, not yields.

1. 47a.

   Page 1:  “By 2099, roughly 76% (55% to 89%) of the boreal region might reach crop feasible GDD conditions, compared to the current 32%.”  “However, most of the newly gained areas are associated with highly seasonal and monthly variations in climatic water balances”. ↩

Cold deaths divided by heat deaths:  Gasparrini 2015, 7.29 % ÷ 0.42 % = 17 ⁶²;  Zhao 2021, 4,594,098 ÷ 489,075 = 9.4 ⁴;  Masselot 2023 as corrected, 130,228 ÷ 13,589 = 9.6 ⁶³. ↩

Cissé, Guéladio et al.  “Health, Wellbeing, and the Changing Structure of Communities.”  Climate Change 2022:  Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability.  Contribution of Working Group II to the Sixth Assessment Report of the IPCC, 1041–1170.  Cambridge University Press.  2022.  The IPCC's chapter on climate and health.  Unlike the summary for policymakers, it discusses cold-related deaths.

1. 49a.

   Section 7.2.4.1, page 1074:  “Although there has been an observed increase in winter-season temperatures for a number of regions, to date there is variable evidence for a consequential reduction in winter mortality and susceptibility to cold over time due to milder winters; some countries demonstrate decreasing trends, while other countries show stable or even increasing trends in cold-attributable mortality fractions over time”.  Section 7.3.1.2, page 1092:  “strong regional contrasts in heat- and cold-related mortality trends are likely under a RCP8.5 scenario, with countries in the Global North experiencing minimal to moderate decreases in cold-related mortality while warm climate countries in the Global South are projected to experience increases in heat-attributable deaths by the end of the century”. ↩

Frederikse, Thomas et al.  “The causes of sea-level rise since 1900.”  Nature 584:393–397.  2020.  A sea-level budget that reconciles tide gauges, satellite altimetry, gravity measurements and ocean temperatures, component by component, since 1900.  It finds the rise has sped up since the 1970s, driven by ocean warming and Greenland's ice loss.

1. 50a.

   Page 394:  “Our GMSL estimate (Fig. 1a) shows a trend of 1.56 ± 0.33 mm yr−1 (90% confidence interval) over 1900–2018.” ↩

Hinkel, Jochen et al.  “Coastal flood damage and adaptation costs under 21st century sea-level rise.”  Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 111(9):3292–3297.  2014.  A global model of coastal flooding (DIVA) run with four climate models, three ice-sheet scenarios, two elevation maps and five socioeconomic pathways, comparing a world that keeps its 1995 dikes with one that raises them.  The authors include Richard Tol, the economist the "net benefit" side relies on.  Mirror:  PMC

1. 51a.

   Page 3292:  “Without adaptation, 0.2–4.6% of global population is expected to be flooded annually in 2100 under 25–123 cm of global mean sea-level rise, with expected annual losses of 0.3–9.3% of global gross domestic product.”  “The global costs of protecting the coast with dikes are significant with annual investment and maintenance costs of US$ 12–71 billion in 2100, but much smaller than the global cost of avoided damages even without accounting for indirect costs of damage to regional production supply.” ↩ ↩

2. 51b.

   Section Results:  “Enhanced protection reduces impacts by about 2 orders of magnitude.”  “Under enhanced protection, impacts are about 2–3 orders of magnitude lower”.  The first sentence is about people flooded, the second about flood costs. ↩

3. 51c.

   Page 3292:  “Flood damages by the end of this century are much more sensitive to the applied protection strategy than to variations in climate and socioeconomic scenarios as well as in physical data sources (topography and climate model).” ↩

4. 51d.

   Page 3292:  “These should also take into account that protecting large parts of the developed coast increases the risk of catastrophic consequences in the case of defense failure.” ↩

Deltacommissie.  Working together with water:  A living land builds for its future.  Findings of the Deltacommissie 2008, summary and conclusions.  Government of the Netherlands.  2008.  The report of the Dutch Delta Committee, chaired by Cees Veerman, which set the country's flood-defence plan to 2100 and beyond.  It deliberately planned for the upper end of projected sea-level rise.

1. 52a.

   Page 8:  “The Delta Committee concludes that a regional sea level rise of 0.65 to 1.3 m by 2100, and of 2 to 4 m by 2200 should be taken into account. This includes the effect of land subsidence. These values represent plausible upper limits based on the latest scientific insights.” ↩ ↩

2. 52b.

   Page 9:  “Implementation of the Delta Programme until 2050 involves a cost of 1.2 to 1.6 billion euros per annum, and 0.9 to 1.5 billion euros per annum in the period 2050–2100.” ↩

The Delta Committee's €1.2–1.6 billion a year divided by Dutch GDP in current euros ⁶¹:  €651.3 billion in 2008 gives 0.18–0.25 %;  €1,121.5 billion in 2024 gives 0.11–0.14 %. ↩

Gething, Peter W. et al.  “Climate change and the global malaria recession.”  Nature 465:342–345.  2010.  A comparison of a historical map of malaria endemicity around 1900 with a modern map for 2007, set against the changes that warming scenarios project.  Mirror:  PMC

1. 54a.

   Section Abstract:  “First, widespread claims that rising mean temperatures have already led to increases in worldwide malaria morbidity and mortality are largely at odds with observed decreasing global trends in both its endemicity and geographic extent. Second, the proposed future effects of rising temperatures on endemicity are at least one order of magnitude smaller than changes observed since c. 1900 and up to two orders of magnitude smaller than those that can be achieved by the effective scale-up of key control measures.”  Section Results:  “endemic/stable malaria is likely to have covered 58% of the world's land surface around 1900 (see Supplementary Table 1 ) but only 30% by 2007”. ↩

IPCC.  “Summary for Policymakers.”  Climate Change 2007:  Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability.  Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC.  Cambridge University Press.  2007.  The summary of the IPCC's 2007 impacts assessment, whose Figure SPM.2 lists impacts by level of warming.

1. 55a.

   Figure SPM.2, page 16:  “Hundreds of millions of people exposed to increased water stress”. ↩

Kundzewicz, Zbigniew W. et al.  “Freshwater resources and their management.”  Climate Change 2007:  Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability.  Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC.  Cambridge University Press.  2007.  The IPCC's 2007 chapter on fresh water, whose lead authors included Nigel Arnell, author of the water-stress study Ridley cites.

1. 56a.

   Page 194:  “Water stress is modelled to decrease by the 2050s on 20 to 29%”.  “of the global land area”.  “and to increase on 62 to 76% of”.  “the global land area”.  “However, using the per capita”.  “water availability indicator, climate change would appear to”.  “reduce global water stress. This is because increases in runoff are”.  “heavily concentrated in the most populous parts of the world”.  The chapter is printed in two columns, and these pieces are one sentence each in the original. ↩

Urban, Mark C.  “Accelerating extinction risk from climate change.”  Science 348(6234):571–573.  2015.  A meta-analysis of 131 published predictions of species' extinction risk under climate change, fitted against the warming each study assumed.

1. 57a.

   Section Results:  “Global extinction risks increase from 2.8% at present to 5.2% at the international”.  “policy target of a 2°C post-industrial rise”.  “If the Earth warms to 3°C, the extinction risk rises to 8.5%.”  Wording of the author's accepted manuscript. ↩

Andela, Niels et al.  “A human-driven decline in global burned area.”  Science 356(6345):1356–1362.  2017.  A NASA-led analysis of satellite records of fire for 1998–2015, separating the effects of rainfall, land use and population on the area burned.

1. 58a.

   Section Abstract:  “We found that global burned area declined by 24.3 ± 8.8% over the past 18 years.”  “Agricultural expansion and intensification were primary drivers of declining fire activity.” ↩

Jones, Matthew W. et al.  “Global and regional trends and drivers of fire under climate change.”  Reviews of Geophysics 60:e2020RG000726.  2022.  A review of satellite fire records, fire-weather reanalyses and attribution studies, region by region, by an international team of fire scientists.

1. 59a.

   Section Abstract:  “BA has reduced by 27% globally in the past two decades, due in large part to a decline in BA in African savannahs”.  “increases in BA of ∼50% or higher have been seen in some extratropical forest ecoregions”.  Section Results:  “We observed that annual FWSL increased by 14 days year −1 during 1979–2019 (+27%)”.  BA is burned area;  FWSL is fire-weather season length. ↩

Cornwall Alliance for the Stewardship of Creation.  An Evangelical Declaration on Global Warming.  2009.  A short statement of belief and denial on global warming, signed by evangelical leaders and a few scientists, including the climatologists Roy Spencer and David Legates.  It cites no data.

1. 60a.

   Section What we believe:  “are robust, resilient, self-regulating, and self-correcting, admirably suited for human flourishing, and displaying His glory.”  The subject is "Earth and its ecosystems", described as created by God and sustained by His providence. ↩

World Bank.  “GDP (current LCU), Netherlands (NY.GDP.MKTP.CN).”  World Development Indicators.  2026.  National accounts data in euros.  Dutch GDP was €651.3 billion in 2008 and €1,121.5 billion in 2024. ↩

Gasparrini, Antonio et al.  “Mortality risk attributable to high and low ambient temperature:  a multicountry observational study.”  The Lancet 386(9991):369–375.  2015.  A time-series study of 74 million deaths in 384 places in 13 countries, 1985–2012, measuring how daily death rates rise on days colder or hotter than each place's optimum.  It established that cold, mostly moderate cold, accounts for far more temperature deaths than heat.  Mirror:  PMC

1. 62a.

   Page 369:  “More temperature-attributable deaths were caused by cold (7·29%, 7·02–7·49) than by heat (0·42%, 0·39–0·44). Extreme cold and hot temperatures were responsible for 0·86% (0·84–0·87) of total mortality.”  The Lancet prints decimal points as raised dots. ↩

Masselot, Pierre et al.  “Excess mortality attributed to heat and cold:  a health impact assessment study in 854 cities in Europe.”  The Lancet Planetary Health 7(4):e271–e281.  2023.  A study of adults in 854 European urban areas, 2000–2019, estimating yearly deaths from cold and heat.  A coding error in the baseline death rates was corrected in July 2024, which cut both totals by about a third and left their ratio almost unchanged;  the numbers here are the corrected ones.

1. 63a.

   Page e271:  “Across the 854 urban areas in Europe, we estimated an annual excess of 130 228 (empirical 95% CI 115 893–143 929) deaths attributed to cold and 13 589 (11 530–15 475)) attributed to heat.” ↩